It seems very common for a person, especially around before Kant’s time, to presume that their own principles of morality also happen to apply to all other people. This is based on the idea that moral principles are come upon through the use of reason, which all rational beings are intrinsically capable of, and therefore transcend all differences of culture or individuality. In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant attempts to develop a matured view of morality that accounts for the obvious differences in moral belief that we observe in one another every day. This view is founded on his reconstruction of reason and its extent, wherein the use of the intellect is more a reflection of oneself than of the outside world. Clearly, we can only obtain information from the outside world through the use of our own senses, and form concepts and ideas through the use of our own understanding. Because of these limitations, it follows that we can never come to definite conclusions about the outside world, as what we are actually experiencing is our own interpretation of it. It is certainly possible then that there are things in the outside world beyond the capacity of our senses and understanding that would render our conception of it entirely inaccurate. It seems necessary then to develop a view of morality that is wholly removed from such distractions.

In this study he examines the metaphysical aspect of morality, setting all matters of practical experience aside. This is in order to attempt to separate our hopefully well-reasoned understanding of morality from anything grounded in less reliable empirical knowledge. Although Kant disagrees that we can all inherently know a one ‘true’ system of morality, because of the shallow extent of our reason, he does believe we intuitively feel a certain guiding principle as rational beings and so seeks to elaborate on it that we may better keep it in mind. He first suggests that in order for such a moral principle to hold true, anybody should feel obliged to follow it necessarily were they to find themselves in the same situation, lest the principle lose its absolute design. Otherwise, it would seem that whatever is being followed is merely a rule of convenience, rather than a stringent moral law. However, it is not enough for an action to merely follow the moral law.

According to Kant, an action displays moral worth only if it is done for the sake of morality itself. Conversely, to perform an action with any ulterior motive in mind, such as a personal want or need, is enough to rob that action of its moral value. Therefore it is the motivation behind an action for which its moral value should be judged, rather than whatever its consequences happen to come to be. In this way, even if a certain action were to wholly conform to the moral law, if it were not also done with the intent of conforming to it, in making the decision to act repeatedly one would often cease to conform in favor of some other acting preference. Kant elaborates on this as being a difference between acting according to duty, and according from duty. In simply acting according to duty we are performing a generally random action, and were we to find ourselves in the same situation again we might choose to act differently. Conversely, were we to be acting according to duty, we would always make the choice to act in the same manner, that being the way in which we conform to our duty to observe the moral law. This is why Kant believes that only acting out of accordance to duty warrants moral value.

To help further explain his thinking Kant outlines four different scenarios wherein a moral decision to act must be carried out. In the first scenario one is acting contrary to duty, such as in the case of a shopkeeper who knowingly steals directly from his customers for profit. This is very obviously an immoral action and deserves no further consideration. In the second scenario, one acts in accordance with duty, but only out of fear of punishment for acting otherwise. An example would be of the shopkeeper who charges his customers fairly, but only out of fear of being caught and subsequently punished for overcharging them. Kant believes this also does not deserve moral praise, because whenever such a fear diminished to a certain point it will no longer cause you to act in accordance with duty. In fact, even if the shopkeeper charges his customers fairly because it provides him pleasure to act in such a way, Kant still believes that such action does not deserve moral praise. In the same way as the second case, it is an unreliable way in which to act from, because overcharging customers at some point may become lucrative enough to change his mind. Instead, it is only through acting according to your duty to moral law, and ignoring any other such impulses, that ones action may warrant praise.

So how is Kant’s Categorical Imperative applied in certain scenarios, such as lying to avoid embarrassment? It would seem that there is no strong moral reason to avoid embarrassment of oneself, but often we might wrongly attract it to others. Kant would probably suggest that we have a duty to avoid causing this to happen, but here he raises a certain distinction in the concept of duty. He notes that there should be a difference between perfect duties, which we are obliged to perform and should be met with blame if we do not, and imperfect duties, which are necessarily endlessly repeatable tasks, and so should be met with praise for performing, without blame for not. In my opinion embarrassment is so circumstantial that we can never reasonably go out of our way to avoid it completely. Often we have no control over whether we bring embarrassment upon ourselves and the people around us, and so it should be an imperfect duty to avoid it, as lying will not always be able to repel it.

Despite the success of introducing the Categorical Imperative to moral philosophy, there have been criticisms of Kant’s work. One common theme is an attack on his lofty belief in the extent of reason, shared by many of his Enlightenment contemporaries. It seems almost directly contradictory the way in which he works to narrow the definition of reason to not be an actual mapping of the world, but rather our slim perceptions of it, and then turns around and hails its virtues over ordinary experience. Many people believe now that rather our culture and personal experience strongly affect the way in which we shape our moral principles. This helps to explain why people will so often totally divide themselves over certain issues like abortion and assisted suicide. If the Categorical Imperative were as effective as Kant wishes it were to be, then how do we still so often come into direct conflict over issues like these when the correct way in which to act following its rule should be readily available?