For many things we believe we are able to come to a real, deep understanding of and determine the truth concerning their underlying nature, it is actually the case that we are entirely unable to come to know anything about them at all, not even so much as their most commonly accepted associated premises. In previously having spent vast lengths of time discussing these concepts, we have only allowed ourselves to grossly step beyond the very limited and apparent bounds of human knowledge, and should instead withhold judgment concerning their absolute truth altogether. Beginning in line 118, Sextus presents his argument for why we should suspend judgment toward all claims made based on spatial considerations, including any apparent positions or relations therein.
In this way, he suggests that the same thing may always appear differently to a subject given separate circumstances, as in the case of a boat rocking back in forth in the waves which appears from afar entirely stationary and also much smaller than it really is. However, moving closer to the boat causes it to expand infinitely in our view, such that we seem unable to come near enough to ever finally determine its true scale. In a similar way, a tower may appear round from a distance, while it can be observed as a square up close, though there is seemingly no instant where this change in appearance immediately takes place, and so it seems that we must set aside all claims based on these sorts of irreconcilable subjective differences in distance. Likewise for claims made based on what can sometimes be apparently unique absolute positions in space, by comparison with subjective relational claims, we should still equally suspend knowledge concerning them. A stick might appear to us one way, while leaving it in the very same place and immersing it in a cup of water will cause it to appear much differently and seemingly shift its position through space. In this way what are even sometimes apparently absolute claims can always be reduced to the sort of relational ones which have already been debunked.
Because all perceptions are in some way grounded on the apparent spatial considerations holding between them, we can not determine the truth behind any claims which are founded on them. In this way although we may express how a thing may contingently appear to oneself through subjective relations with other things in space, we should always remain critical of such claims. While this sort of hard skepticism seems irrefutable in the end, I believe it allows for the development of a better pragmatic working understanding of the world through the process of statistical collectivization of such claims made among a group of people, regardless of whether we will ever be able to determine their absolute truth.